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 A critical comparison of Cognitive Social Psychology 
and Discursive Social Psychology. 
 
By Damian E M Milton 
 
The methods used by social scientists are inextricably linked to the theoretical foundations 
that underpin their practices.  The practical methodological strategies employed by 
researchers are thus informed by ontological (nature of reality) and epistemological (how 
knowledge is claimed) arguments pertaining to the nature of lived reality.  Taylor (2007) 
states that throughout the twentieth century, the dominant paradigm in Social Psychology 
was that of the Cognitive perspective, with the largest amount of funding dedicated to it, the 
largest number of published research articles, and the largest number of practicing 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ? dŚŝƐ  ?ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĞĐŚŽĞĚ ƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ Ăůů ƐŽĐŝĂů ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ďǇ  ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ ? ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?  dŚŝƐ ĞƐƐĂǇ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ
methodological differences between the Cognitive Social Psychological paradigm and that of 
Discursive Social Psychology, a far more recent set of ideas and concepts that emerged far 
ŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ŝŶƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚĞďĂƚĞĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐŚŝŐŚůǇ  ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŽĨ
the positivist mainstream. 
 
Early psychologists attempted to establish psychological principles and early experiments 
ƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ  ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĂďůĞ ? ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? These 
methods were also used by psychologists to question a broad range of social psychological 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂƐƚŚĞ ?ŽďũĞĐƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?DŽĞĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ůůƉŽƌƚ ?
1924, cited in Holloway, 2007a).  The early dominant paradigm in psychology was that of 
Behaviourism, yet this was usurped by the Cognitive paradigm in the latter part of the 20
th
 
century.   
 
Two main traditions can be found within the Cognitive Social Psychological perspective.  The 
first (based largely on American Psychological Social Psychology  W PSP) frames the individual 
as having limited cognitive resources ƚŽŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚĂŶǇƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞ ?ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞŵŝƐĞƌ ?).  The 
ontological assumption being that these cognitive thought processes shape the social world.  
The second based on European Social Identity theory (Tajfel, cited in Holloway, 2007a) 
where cognitions are seen to be structured by group membership (thus involving more of an 
interaction between the influence of the individual and society). 
 
The Cognitive perspective attempts to look for the causes of behaviour, by testing the causal 
role of controllable and measurable variables; primarily using quantifiable methods of data 
collection and using standardised statistical techniques to analyse the potentially significant 
patterns and correlations in the data and highlight possible causal effects.  A controlled 
environment is seen as necessary to isolate the effects of particular causal interventions.  In 
order to isolate variables, the Cognitive perspective is deliberately reductionist in order to 
rule out other possibilities of causal relations.  The preferred method of investigation is 
therefore the experiment.  Participants are unaware of the experimental manipulation of 
 variables, which can only be explained in a debriefing (raising an ethical issue of deception).  
Due to ethical concerns being raised over a number of studies, it is now necessary to seek 
ethical approval for research, where deception is minimised and participants have the right 
to withdraw their data from resultant research findings.   
 
Perhaps due to various criticisms made concerning the ecological validity of experimental 
studies, Cognitive theorists have also employed experiments in field settings, set up to look 
at certain issues within a naturally occurring environment.  Methodologies such as surveys, 
case studies and combining qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques are also 
used. 
 
ůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ?ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ
paradigms were evolving within the social sciences that took an emancipatory view to 
research, such as Marxism and Feminism.  Stainton Rodgers (2001) argued that feminist 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ?ŵĂůĞƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ
(including the pathologising of femininity); and was explicitly political in advocating for 
radical social change.  ůƐŽ ? ŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ  ?^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ^ŽĐŝĂů
WƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ?  ?SSP or  ?ŵŝĐƌŽ-ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ďĂƐĞĚ on symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934; 
Goffman, 1959; and Becker, 1963; cited in Holloway, 2007a); and the ethnomethodology of 
Garfinkel (1967, cited in Holloway, 2007a).  These theorists argued that society preceded the 
individual and that the self was formed in the process of interaction.  These developments 
ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞŶ ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ?ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ƚƵƌŶ ? ŝŶ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă  ?ŶĞǁ
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ?  dŚĞ  ?ƉŽƐƚ-ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ŽĨ ǁƌŝƚĞƌƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ  ? ? ? ? ?, cited in Holloway, 
2007a) argued that theory and claims to knowledge were forms of situated discourse, 
embedded in wider cultural practices.  For Foucault (1970, cited in Holloway, 2007a), social 
behaviour is a discursive activity that leads to the construction of meaning.  Not only did 
these theories problematise the individualism of Cognitive theories, but also the idea of a 
social agent acting upon an autonomous will. 
 
Due to the critiques proffered by the variety of theoretical views that developed in Europe 
ĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞĂ  ?ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ŝŶŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵƐŽĐŝĂůƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ŝŶƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?
Some criticised the use of deception and the reductionist findings of experimental research 
(Silverman, 1977, cited in Holloway, 2007a), whilst others criticised the individualist stance 
of Cognitive models, leading to a cultural discourse of individual responsibility for success 
and failure (Sampson, 1977, cited in Holloway, 2007a). 
 
Stainton-Rodgers (2003, cited in Taylor, 2007) argued that  ?critical ? theorists had challenged 
the use of experimental methods and championed interpretive methodology, to the point 
that these represented two clearly segregated camps.  Taylor (2007) suggests that a pivotal 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ
according to variables.  This can be contrasted to discursive social psychology that 
emphasises the multi-factorial, overlapping, contradictory and complex nature of social 
phenomena.  Prilleltensky and Nelson (2002, cited in Taylor, 2007) argue that taking a 
 ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝƐŵŽƌĞ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ĨŝĞůĚŽĨ ƐƚƵĚǇ ?  &Žƌ 'ŝůů  ? ? ? ? ?, cited in 
Taylor, 2007), this involves a political project and a participatory epistemological stance 
 ƚŽǁĂƌĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ?dŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚďŝŶĚƐƚŚĞƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŝŶƵŶŝƚǇŝƐ
that objectivity is not possible within social research.  This can be contrasted to the positivist 
assertion that value-free research in the social sciences is not only possible, but seen as a 
standard of credibility.  
 
Influenced by Foucault (1970, cited in Holloway, 2007a) and the American SSP tradition, 
Potter and Wetherell (1987, cited in Holloway, 2007a) utilised discourse analysis as a 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŝŶ^ŽĐŝĂůWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞǇƵƐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ
locating this concept in the mind; they argued that attitudes were not fixed, but changeable 
upon context.  They suggested ƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞĞŵƉůŽǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞƌĞƉĞrƚŽŝƌĞƐ ?ĂŵĂƐƐĞĚĨƌŽŵ
their surrounding culture to explain social reality.  Potter and Wetherell (1987, cited in 
Holloway, 2007b) criticised the use of the Likert Scale (1932, cited in Holloway, 2007b), 
popular in psychometric testing, by arguing that when participants read a statement, they 
ĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?ŽďũĞĐƚŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?ƚŚƵƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĨƌŽŵƐƵĐŚƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂƌĞ
not generalisable.  The kind of knowledge produced by Likert Scales was thus seen as 
limiting the complexity of human expression and as potentially producing false universals. 
 
Discursive Social Psychology takes its inspiration from the work of post-structuralists and 
SSP.  The ontological assertions made by this perspective frame the individual and the social 
world as constituted through discourse and social practices; and challenges the  ?essentialist ? 
notion that personhood is a fixed and ongoing phenomenon, or that social reality is in some 
ǁĂǇ ?ŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐĂďůĞ prior to human constructions of it.  Thus DSP is not interested 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ  ?ĐĂƵƐĞƐ ? ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? Individuals within discourses are 
positioned in shifting relations of power.  According to this perspective, power permeates 
every human relationship, yet is not absolute.  For Foucault (1970, cited in Holloway, 2007a), 
people develop their identities located within a cultural context, rather then being perceived 
as separate from it.  By stating this argument, Foucault (1970, cited in Holloway, 2007a) 
challenged the traditional polar dualism of causation of phenomena being embedded within 
either the individual or social structure. 
 
The main methodological focus in Discursive Social Psychology, is the analysis of the 
construction of meaning through  ?ƚĂůŬ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƚĞǆƚ ? and the cultural resources that individuals 
draw upon, in order to make sense of a complex social reality.  The dominant method of DSP 
is  ?discourse analysis ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐŚŽǁƉĞŽƉůĞ draw upon existent discourses to 
frame their identities ĂŶĚďƵŝůĚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞƌĞƉĞrƚŽŝƌĞƐ ?ĨŽƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ.  
Within these repertoires, subject positions are taken up, therefore researchers are also 
committed to reflecting upon their own positionality.  Discursive social psychologists 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ  ?ŝŶŶĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ? Contrasting 
the Cognitive perspective, identity is seen as an active/interactive process, where discourses 
ĂƌĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚďǇŽƚŚĞƌƐĂŶĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŽĐĐƵƉǇ ?ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĨůĞǆŝďůĞŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
 
The once dominant position occupied by positivist social science may have been 
ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůǇ ĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ?ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ƚƵƌŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ƚŚĞ ?ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ŚĂƐ ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ƚŽ
 ?ƐŚŝĨƚ ? ?  /ƚ ŝƐ ƌĂƌĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐŽƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĐůŝŵĂƚĞ ĨŽƌŬnowledge produced by research to claim 
ideological neutrality.  Knowledge is primarily seen as situated within paradigmatic 
 ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŶŐŵĂŶǇƚŽĂĚŽƉƚĂ ?ƉŽƐƚ-ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ ?Žƌ ?ŵŝǆĞĚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ
ƌĞĂůŝƐƚ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ  ?ďĞƐƚ ? ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
ĂƐŬĞĚ ?dŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇďĞŐŝŶƐƚŽ
erode, when both utilise a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. 
 
In conclusion, it is the philosophical rather than necessarily methodological differences 
between the social psychological perspectives that demarcate their boundaries.  Having said 
this, both  ?mainƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? and  ?critŝĐĂů ? ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ have developed by critiquing each 
other; and as methodological divides begin to erode, the theoretical divide has also begun to 
narrow, bringing into question the usefulness of the  ?mainstream ? ǀĞƌƐƵƐ  ?critical ? ĚŝǀŝĚĞ ?
Perhaps, the biggest difference remaining between the perspectives is of an ethical nature, 
with  ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ? ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ power relations embedded in knowledge 
production and the advocacy of alternative voices.  This essay has shown a powerful 
relationship exists between the methods used by researchers and the knowledge they 
produce.   ?Critical ? theory explicitly emphasises power relations in order to try to advocate 
for and improve the lives of marginalised groups in society; and have critiqued Cognitive 
models for reifying and perpetuating existing power relations; including that between 
researcher and participant (Taylor, 2007).  Discursive social psychology situates itself within 
a critical stance by emphasising the socially situated nature of their interpretations and their 
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